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Recent Developments
BANKRUPTCY - UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE - After-
Acquired Property Provisions Of Uniform Commercial Code Held
Not To Conflict With Section 60 Of Bankruptcy Act. ]n re Port-
land Newspaper Publishing Co., 4 INSTAL. CRED. GUIDE j 97,994
(D. Ore. Aug. 22, 1967). Through November 22, 1963, Rose City
Development Co. had loaned $55,300 to Portland Newspaper Publish-
ing Co. On that date, the parties entered into a security agreement
under which Portland gave Rose City a security interest in all of Port-
land's accounts receivable, both present and future. Pursuant to the
requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code,1 a financing statement
was filed. On October 15, 1964, wage claimants of Portland filed an
involuntary bankruptcy petition, and shortly thereafter Portland was
adjudicated bankrupt. Approximately ninety-five percent of Portland's
accounts receivable had come into existence within the four months
before the petition had been filed. The Bankruptcy Referee held that
Rose City's perfected security interest in these accounts constituted
a voidable preference under Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act.2 A
preference is defined in Section 60 as "a transfer . .. for or on account
of an antecedent debt . . .within four months before the filing."3 The
district court reversed, holding that the "transfer" occurred as to future
accounts receivable when the security agreement was executed and the
financing statement was properly filed, and, alternatively, even if the
"transfer" had occurred within the four month period prior to bank-
ruptcy, it had not been for an "antecedent debt" as required by Sec-
tion 60.
Whether or not the "floating lien" provision of the Code4 con-
flicts with Section 60 has been hotly debated for the past decade.5 The
Code provision allows a secured party to take a security interest which
"floats" over all of his debtor's present and future assets.6 The validity
and perfection of the "floating lien" does not depend on "policing" of
any kind.7 In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co. is the first case
1. Oregon, the jurisdiction where all the transactions connected with the case
took place, had adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, effective September 1, 1963.
2. In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., 4 INSTAL. CRVD. GUIDE f 98,483(D. Ore. 1966).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1964).
4. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-108. See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 9-306.
5. See, e.g., 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §§
45.1-10 (1965); Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Commercial
Code: Some Problems Suggested by Articles 2 and 9, 14 RUTGERS L. Rtv. 518 (1960) ;
Viles, The Uniform Commercial Code v. Bankruptcy Act, 55 Ky. L.J. 636 (1967);
42 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 150 (1967).
6. See I G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 11.7, at
359 (1965).
7. In Section 9-205, the Code repeals the "dominion" rule of Benedict v. Ratner,
268 U.S. 353 (1925). Compliance with this rule through strict "policing" of accounts
avoided the Section 60 "antecedent debt" problem because new value was given by
the secured creditor for each new account receivable. See generally 1 G. GILMORE,
SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 8.3 (1965).
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in which the application of Section 9-108 in a federal bankruptcy pro-
ceeding has been squarely raised and decided. The district court
pointed out that two subsidiary questions are involved: 1) "was Rose
City's security interest in the accounts transferred within four months
of the bankruptcy?"'8 and if so 2) "was the transfer of the security
interest in the accounts which came into existence during the four
month period for an antecedent debt?"' In order for Rose City's
security interest to constitute a voidable preference, both questions
would have to be answered in the affirmative.' °
In his well-considered opinion, the Referee pointed out that the
Code specifically provides when and how a security interest attaches
and is perfected" and reasoned that when the Code provisions are
read with Section 60's definition of "transfer,' 'I 2 the conclusion must
be that there was no "transfer" until the accounts came into existence.
The district court disagreed with the Referee's analysis. Relying on
Rosenberg v. Rudnick,'" which had been decided after the Referee's
decision in the instant case, the court suggested that the accounts
receivable should be viewed as a single entity or res, and not as a con-
glomeration of individual accounts. 4 Under this view, the Section 60
"transfer" occurred when the security agreement was executed and
not when each individual account came into existence. However, Dean
Boden, among others, has pointed out that the "Code is very specific
in its rules with respect to attachment and perfection and quite
8. 4 INSTAL. CRz. Guing ff 97,994, at 88,681.
9. Id.
10. In addition, all the other six criteria of Section 60 had to be satisfied. See
note 2 supra. The Referee had determined these in favor of the bankruptcy trustee.
11. 4 INSTAL. CR D. GUIDE 1 98,483, at 89,075. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
9-204(1) provides that, "A security interest cannot attach until there is agreement...
that it attach and value is given and the debtor has rights in the collateral." UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CoDE § 9-204(2) provides, "For the purpose of this section the debtor
has no rights . . . in an account until it comes into existence." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 9-303(1) provides, "A security interest is perfected when it has attached
and when all of the applicable steps required for perfection have been taken."
12. 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (2) (1964) provides: "[A] transfer of property other than
real property shall be deemed to have been made ... at the time when it became so far
perfected that no subsequent lien upon such property obtainable by legal or equitable
proceedings on a simple contract could become superior to the rights of the transferee."
13. 262 F. Supp. 635 (D. Mass. 1967). In this case, the bankruptcy trustee con-
tended that the defendant's floating lien on those items of the debtor's inventory
acquired within four months of bankruptcy constituted a voidable preference. However,
despite the court's vigorous defense of the Code, Rosenberg v. Rudnick turns entirely
on the failure of the trustee to produce evidence sufficient to show either the inventory
items that had been acquired within the four months prior to bankruptcy or, alterna-
tively, the increase in value of the debtor's inventory during the four month period.
Id. at 640.
14. In Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp. 635 (1967), the court, relying on
Article 9, takes the position that a Section 60(a) (2) "transfer" occurs at the time of
filing, even though the debtor at that time has yet to acquire any interest in the
collateral. Id. at 638. This view overlooks Section 9-312(5) (b) of the Code which
provides that priority between conflicting security interests in the same collateral shall
be determined "in order of perfection unless both are perfected by filing .. " Under the
Code, a security interest in goods can be perfected without filing if the creditor is in
possession of them. See § 9-305. Furthermore, a security interest in accounts receiv-
able can, in some situations, be perfected without filing. See § 9-302(1) (e). There-
fore. it seems clear that in order to satisfy the requirement of Section 60(a) (2) that
"no subsequent lien . . . could become superior," perfection of the security interest
is necessary.
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clearly deals with after-acquired property on an item-by-item basis."'"
He has also stated that, "there is grave doubt that the so-called unitary
or single res theory can be fitted into the present scheme of Section
60 in that Section 60 is concerned with transfers of specific items
of property."'
6
However, even if the district court erred in its disposition of the
"transfer" question, there can be no Section 60 "preference" unless the
"transfer" was for an "antecedent debt." Resolution of the "antecedent
debt" question turns on what effect is to be given to Section 9-108
of the Code which provides, inter alia, that where a secured party
gives new value which is to be secured by after-acquired property, his
security interest in the after-acquired property shall be deemed to be
taken for new value and not for an antecedent debt.' 7 The Referee
decided that Section 9-108 could not be reconciled with the purpose
of Section 60'1 and that the transfer was for an "antecedent debt,"
as federal law must prevail over contradictory state law.' Again
relying on Rosenberg v. Rudnick,s ° the district court reversed the
Referee, stating that the "floating lien" served a useful business pur-
pose, 'and that "[w]ithout a clear-cut conflict, UCC § 9-108 should
not be held to contravene Section 60."' "l
The Bankruptcy Act does not define "antecedent debt," and the
legislative history of Section 60 seems to be of little help in drawing
definite conclusions as to the congressional intent.22 The ultimate
question raised seems to be whether the policy of the Bankruptcy Act
taken as a whole contravenes Section 9-108. A number of bankruptcy
scholars have argued that it does. They have pointed out that among
the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act are the equalization of recovery
of creditors from the depleted estate of the bankrupt and the nullifica-
tion of transfers within four months of bankruptcy to creditors attempt-
ing to obtain "preference" over other creditors. 23
Other writers have argued that pre-Code "policing" devices accom-
plished the same thing as Section 9-108 in a much more cumbersome
15. Boden, Some Areas of Conflict Between the Uniform Commercial Code and
the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 41 J. NA^'L CONF. RIr. BANKR. 76, 81 (1967).
16. Id.
17. Section 9-108 provides:Where a secured party makes an advance, incurs an obligation, releases a
perfected security interest, or otherwise gives new value which is to be securedin whole or in part by after-acquired property his security interest in the after-
acquired collateral shall be deemed to be taken for new value and not as security
for an antecedent debt if the debtor acquires his rights in such collateral either
in the ordinary course of his business or under a contract of purchase made pur-
suant to the security agreement within a reasonable time after new value is given.
18. 4 INSTAL. CRD. GUID 98,483, at 89,075-79.
19. Rosenberg v. Rudnick suggests, however, that because the Uniform Com-
mercial Code has been adopted nation-wide, it has been promoted to the status of
national law. 262 F. Supp. at 639.
20. 262 F. Supp. 635 (D. Mass. 1967).
21. 4 INSTAL. CRD. Gump 97,994, at 88,683.
22. Compare Viles, The Uniform Commercial Code v. the Bankruptcy Act, 55
Ky. L.J. 636, 673 (1967) (the legislative history of Section 60 indicates that it con-flicts with Section 9-108), with 65 MicH. L. RIzv. 1004, 1009-11 (1967) (the legislative
history of Section 60 indicates that it does not conflict with Section 9-108).
23. See Viles, The Uniform Commercial Code v. the Bankruptcy Act, 55 Ky.
L.J. 636, 641, 666-72 (1967).
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and expensive fashion.24 They have concluded that this provision of
the Code recognizes and facilitates current commercial practice and
that therefore its "new value" provision should be read into Section 60.
It would seem advisable that final resolution of the problem be accom-
plished by means of legislative clarification rather than by judicial
attempts to ascertain what seems to be an uncertain legislative intent.2 5
TORTS - Cause Of Action For "Wrongful Life." Gleitman
v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967). Plaintiffs, an infant
and his parents, sued to recover for damages resulting from the alleged
malpractice of the defendant obstetricians.' The trial court dismissed
the infant's claim at the end of plaintiffs' case and that of his parents
after all the evidence was heard.
While under the care of the defendants, the plaintiff-mother in-
formed them that she had contracted german measles in the early
stages of her pregnancy. It is a medically accepted fact that women
who contract german measles in the first trimester of pregnancy give
birth to defective babies in about 10o%-60% of such cases.' The plain-
tiffs claimed that the defendants failed to inform the plaintiff-mother
of this danger, thereby deviating from generally accepted medical
standards8 and depriving her of the option of bearing the child or
having the pregnancy aborted.
The case was decided on motion for judgment; consequently,
the testimony and all reasonable inferences therefrom were assumed
to be true. Accordingly, the court assumed that the defendants had
affirmatively misled the mother, that she could have obtained an abor-
tion without criminal violation, and that she did not do so because of
her justifiable reliance on the erroneous advice of the defendants.
It was in this posture that the New Jersey court reached the
merits of the infant-plaintiff's novel cause of action (and that of his
parents emanating therefrom) for "wrongful life." In essence, the
infant claimed that but for the negligence of the defendants, he would
not have been born to suffer with an impaired body.4 Otherwise stated,
he claimed that the conduct of the defendants prevented his mother
from obtaining an abortion which would have terminated his existence.
24. 1 G. GILmORE, S4cuRrrY INrTRMSTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 11.7, at 360
(1965).
25. See Editorial, Article 9 of the UCC and Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act
Should be Revised and Coordinated, 41 J. NAT'L CoNE. Rzp. BANKR. 66 (1967).
1. The plaintiffs in this case are the infant, whose claim was for being born
defective; the mother, for the effect on her emotional state caused by her son's con-
dition; and the father, for the added medical costs, etc., incurred in caring for his
defective child.
2. Rendle-Short, Maternal Rubella, The 'Practical Management of a Case, 2
LANcm 373 (1964).
3. This deviation was verified by the testimony of plaintiffs' expert medical
witness.
4. The infant in this case was almost blind, deaf and mute, and probably men-
tally retarded.
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Thus, the basis of his cause of action was that his very life was
wrongful. The court sustained the trial court's decision and held that
the conduct complained of, even if true, did not give rise to an action
cognizable at law. The court found that it was logically impossible
to measure the damages because of the inability to value the meta-
physical concept of non-existence ;5 and, even if an action for said
damages were cognizable, a claim for them would be precluded by a
countervailing public policy which declares that "it is basic to the
human condition to seek life and hold on to it however heavily bur-
dened."6 The court concluded that if a cause of action for "wrongful
life" is to be recognized, it is the legislature which must make that
judgment.
Three other courts of last resort have considered the cause of
action for "wrongful life."'  All three have dismissed the claim. How-
ever, in so doing, one court had to reverse the decision of a lower
court, in which the plaintiff's action had been sustained.' These cases,
as did Gleitman, denied the "wrongful life" claim primarily because
of public policy reasons9 and deferred its recognition to the judgment
of the legislature. One court went so far as to state that the plaintiff's
claim alleged sufficient facts to constitute a valid cause of action in tort,
but because the interest of society was so involved and the action
needed to redress the tort was so far-reaching, the court left recognition
of such a cause of action to the legislature. 10
5. See Tedeschi, On Tort Liability For "Wrongful Life," 1 ISRASL L. Rev. 513,
529 (1966). In this case the usual "tort" compensatory damages would be the differ-
ence between life burdened with the resulting birth defects and the utter void of non-
existence; not the difference between life with the defects and life free of such defects.
See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 25, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967).
6. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 26, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (1967).
7. Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Zepeda v.
Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964) ;
Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966). The
Pinkney case involved, inter alia, an action in tort by a daughter against her father
for the illicit conduct and relationship which he carried on with her mother, as a
consequence of which, she was born to suffer with the stigma of bastardy. The court
held, primarily because of existing public policy, that absent express legislative
authority, an action for "wrongful" life would not lie. In the Zepeda case, the father
of the infant-plaintiff, by fraudulent promises of marriage, induced the mother to
have sexual intercourse with him, and as a result the plaintiff was born to suffer with
the stigma of illegitimacy. After admitting that the father had committed a wilful
tort against the infant, the court, because of the complex and far-reaching social conse-
quences appurtenant to any recognition of the plaintiff's claim, held that its recognition
must be left to the legislature. The Williams case involved a suit by an illegitimate
infant, who was born as a result of a sexual assault on the mother in a state mental
institution, against the state for its negligence in failing to prevent the assault, i.e.,
negligent supervision. The court dismissed the infant's claim because it was impossible
to determine the damages and because policy and social reasons demanded rejection
of the cause of action.
8. Williams v. State, 46 Misc. 2d 824, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
9. A somewhat different statement of this public policy is that "no one has an
inalienable right to be born under one set of circumstances rather than another or to
one pair of parents rather than another. The appellant here may well have to bear
the unfair burden - but the law knows no cure for it." Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So.
2d 52, 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). See Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 482, 223
N.E.2d 343, 344 (1966).
10. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849, 858 (1963), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964). The opinion contains an extensive discussion of the types
of cases which could be brought if the action were to be recognized.
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As a prerequisite to judging the merits of a cause of action for
wrongful life, a court must assume that an infant can sue for a tort
perpetrated on him when not viable and that eugenic abortions can
be secured with criminal impunity. On the first question, the early
decisions were quite uniform in holding that neither a child nor his
personal representative had a cause of action for prenatal injury;"
however, recent cases permit such actions,' 2 although several states
require that the fetus be viable at the time of the negligent act. At
present, Maryland appears to require viability;13 however, there are
no recent decisions of record in this state which have denied a right
of action on the ground that the fetus was not viable. Because the
courts are now making more enlightened decisions as a result of sub-
stantial advances in medical technology, there is reason to believe that
future decisions will eventually discard the viability requirement.
1 4
The Gleitman court determined that a rejection of the claim was
compelled by the public policy supporting the preciousness of life.
Defendants argued that it was wrong to destroy four healthy babies
because the fifth one might have some defect. Plaintiffs' claim is
indeed diametrically opposed to this public policy to the extent that
it advocated the practice of eugenic abortion, a method of improving
the physical and mental qualities of future generations wherein defec-
tive or sub-normal fetuses are destroyed. Giving a mother the option
of abortion in the event that there is some probability of her child
being born defective would violate the policy announced in Gleitman,
particularly since any such decision would be based on probabilities.
Furthermore, defects vary greatly in their severity, with many being
correctable.' 5 Although public policy is an obstacle to the recognition
of the wrongful life claim, it seems clear that a change in the abortion
laws, such as permitting "german measle abortions," would vitiate this
obstacle, in that such action by the legislature would in effect change
the public policy.
In most jurisdictions, an abortion, other than for protection of
the health or life of the mother or where the fetus is dead, would
constitute a criminal violation. Maryland permits an abortion only
if no other method will secure the safety of the mother or if the fetus
11. Reed, Pre-natal Injuries: Development of the Right of Recovery, 10 DZVENSs
L.J. 29 (1961).
12. E.g., Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipeline Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727(1956); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Sinkler v. Kneale,
401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1961) (first month of pregnancy).
13. See State v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964) (fetus need not be
born alive) ; Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951).
14. The right to bring an action must not be confused with the ability to prove
the facts. Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951). Furthermore,
the injustice of excluding actions by non-viable fetuses becomes manifest when it is
realized that the results of the negligent actor's conduct are precisely the same whether
the fetus was viable or not. See Comment, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the
Law Relating to Pre-natal Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. RAv. 554, 564 (1962).
15. Ryan, Humane Abortion Laws and the Health Needs of Society, 17 W. Rxs.
L. Rxv. 424, 429 (1965).
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is dead.16 However, recently proposed statutory changes1" indicate a
possible shift in present policies in that they advocate a substantial
relaxation of present restrictions in an attempt to cope with contempo-
rary medical and social dilemmas. These proposed laws would permit
an abortion where, for example, the pregnancy is a result of rape or
incest or where there is a "substantial risk ... that the child will be born
with grave physical or mental defects.""' It is at least arguable that this
last criterion would permit a eugenic abortion where a mother con-
tracts german measles early in pregnancy. But without considering
the exact medical facts which will satisfy the criterion, these proposed
statutes will permit abortions for reasons similar in nature to those in
the Gleitman case, thereby substantially increasing the probability that
a "wrongful life" action will be recognized.
Assuming that there is no viability requirement and that the abor-
tion involved would be legal, the only obstacle of any substance remain-
ing to thwart the recognition of a wrongful life claim is the measur-
ability of damages. In dismissing the plaintiffs' claim, the Gleitman
court appears to have followed the reasoning of other courts which,
upon being presented with a novel claim, have sought refuge in the
"crevice" of indeterminable damages. There is little doubt that the
plaintiffs have suffered real injury as a proximate result of the defend-
ants' negligence. The nebulousness of damages for mental suffering
resulting from defamation or invasion of privacy, for example, no
longer precludes the award of such damages; to the contrary, some
of the largest damage awards to date have been meted out in such suits.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs' claim for wrongful life should not be denied
on such a ground. For example, one formula suggested for measuring
the damages states:
There should be a point at which life under sufficiently adverse
conditions could be deemed to be neither more or less desirable
than non-existence, and it is the equivalent of this position which
the award of damages should restore plaintiff.'9
A practical aspect of the wrongful life claim is that even if the
claim is recognized, the plaintiff will be saddled with an onerous burden
in trying to prove that the disadvantages of his life (which was the
proximate result of the defendant's negligence) outweigh the benefits.
16. MD. CODA ANN. art 27, § 3 (1967).
17. MODPL PSNAL CODM § 230.3(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) provides
in part:
A licensed physician is justified in terminating a pregnancy if he believes there is
substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely impair the
physical or mental health of the mother or that the child would be born with
grave physical or mental defect, or that the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest,
or other felonious intercourse. (Emphasis added.)
For proposals to the same effect, see CommissioN STrAF1 NoTrs, PRoposEn N.Y. PNAL
LAW § 130.05, at 335 (1964).
18. MODXL PSNAL CODS § 230.3(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
19. 49 IowA L. Rtv. 1005, 1009 (1964). It has been suggested that damages
should be awarded, if only for their deterrent effects. See 112 U. PA. L. Rzv. 780,
784 (1964).
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Nevertheless, the possibility logically exists that this burden might be
satisfied. In fact, the infant in Gleitman, being blind, a deaf mute,
and mentally retarded, might very well have been able to satisfy that
burden. It is questionable, however, how much success a victim of
less severe defects would have in trying to convince a trier of fact
that 'he would rather be non-existent than alive in his condition.
A fortiori, illegitimate children, in view of the improved treatment
accorded them, would have almost no chance of success.
With respect to the claim of the parents, it appears, assuming an
appropriate change in the abortion laws, that they have a valid claim
with legally ascertainable damages. Generally the parent's action for
damages resulting from injury to the child is viewed as a derivative
claim dependent upon the validity of the child's claim. 0 In Gleitman,
the claim of the mother was apparently viewed as independent, the
tortious act being the denial of the option to terminate the life of the
child while he was an embryo.2 It is apparent that the mother has
been subjected to real emotional harm22 and that the father has been
burdened with added medical expenses. However, the court was un-
willing to recognize the parents' claim, because it was unwilling to
recognize their right to terminate the life of the child.
The question of whether or not to recognize a cause of action
for wrongful life is a difficult one. The plaintiffs in such an action
must establish the customary elements of duty, negligence, proximate
cause, and damages; moreover, discard of the viability requirement
and the enactment of liberal abortion laws are conditions precedent to
recognition of such a claim. However, the seeds of such a change
have been sown by the proposed abortion laws and the recent tend-
ency to permit recovery for pre-natal injuries inflicted while the fetus
is non-viable. By its action, the Gleitman court has condoned or
granted immunity to the negligent acts of the defendants, thereby
allowing the plaintiffs' injuries to go unredressed.2s Such a result is
a blatant violation of the public policy which condemns any such im-
munity to tortfeasors. It seems reasonable to conclude that the wrong-
ful life claim will be recognized in the future in those jurisdictions
where the viability requirement has been discarded and the abortion
laws liberalized, because the courts in such jurisdictions are unlikely
to bar recovery because of uncertainty in the measurement of damages.
20. W. PaossnR, ToRts § 119, at 910-16 (3d ed. 1964).
21. The majority did not clearly distinguish between the claim of the wife and
that of the husband. The dissent viewed the wife's claim as independent and the
husband's claim as derived from the wife's.
22. The principal reason for denying recovery for emotional harm is the possibility
of numerous fictitious claims. Many jurisdictions refuse to permit recovery for emo-
tional harm unless, for example, there has been some "impact" upon the person of the
plaintiff, the theory being that the "impact" requirement affords a guarantee that the
harm is genuine. See W. PROSS4R, ToRTs § 55, at 350-52 (3d ed. 1964). However,
this reasoning is invalid in cases similar to Gleitman because from the very nature
of the child's condition it seems certain that the mother and father will suffer emotional
harm, thereby minimizing the danger of fictitious claims.
23. See dissenting opinion of Jacobs, J., in Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 36,
227 A.2d 689, 703 (1967).
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - The Subcontractor And
Joint Venturer As Statutory Employers. Carter v. Sims Crane
Service, Inc., 198 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1967) and Hamman v. United
States, 267 F. Supp. 420 (D. Mont. 1967). In Carter v. Sims Crane
Service, Inc.,' the plaintiff, an employee of a subcontractor, brought
a negligence action against the defendant, Sims Crane Service, Inc.,
another subcontractor on the same job, for personal injury suffered
during the course of his employment. The trial court entered summary
judgment for the defendant, holding that he was the plaintiff's em-
ployer within the meaning of the Florida Workmen's Compensation
Act' and was therefore immune from suit in tort because of the
"exclusive remedy" provision.3  The Florida Supreme Court affirmed
on the ground that the Act identifies a general contractor, together
with his subcontractors, as being a "common employer whose liability
for compensation may be met by either party."4
1. 198 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1967).
2. FLA. ST'AT. ANN. § 440.10 (1966).
3. Id. § 440.11. For a discussion of the general employer as a third party, see
Annots., 166 A.L.R. 813 (1947), 151 A.L.R. 1359 (1944).
4. 198 So. 2d at 27. The court based this holding on a prior interpretation of
the following portion of § 440.10:
In case a contractor sublets any part or parts of his contract work to a subcon-
tractor or subcontractors, all of the employees of such contractor and subcontractor
or subcontractors engaged on such contract work shall be deemed to be employed
in one and the same business or establishment, and the contractor shall be liable
for and shall secure the payment of compensation to all such employees, except
to employees of a subcontractor who has secured such payment.
In Younger v. Giller Contracting Co., 143 Fla. 335, 196 So. 690 (1940), an injured
employee of the general contractor brought a negligence action against a subcontractor.
In denying the action, the court held that § 440.10 had the effect of making the prin-
cipal contractor the statutory employer of all the employees of such contractor and
subcontractors engaged on the same job for all purposes. The court concluded that
because all of the subcontractors' employees are employees of the principal con-
tractor, the subcontractors stand on the same ground as the principal contractor,
making the subcontractors as much the employers of all the employees as the prin-
cipal contractor. In the Carter case, the court stated: "The provision, Sec. 440.10,
supra, that all employees on such contract work 'shall be deemed to be employed in
one and the same business' is most reasonably construed to make statutory fellow
servants of all of the employees engaged in the common enterprise under the general
contractor as statutory employer." 198 So. 2d at 26-27.
The Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act contains an analogous provision.
MD. CoD. ANN. art. 101, § 62 (1964 repl. vol.), reads as follows:
"Sec. 62. Employees of subcontractor may claim against contractor.
When any person as a principal contractor, undertakes to execute any
work ... and contracts with any other person as subcontractor, for the execution
by or under the subcontractor, of the whole or any part of the work undertaken by
the principal contractor, the principal contractor shall be liable to pay to any work-
man employed in the execution of the work any compensation under this article
which he would have been liable to pay if that workman had been immediately
employed by him ....
The leading case on this section is State ex rel. Hubert v. Bennett Bldg. Co.,
154 Md. 159, 140 A. 52 (1928). There the court felt that in order for the Workmen's
Compensation Act to be applicable, a master-servant relationship must exist in the
common law sense. Because of this prerequisite, the Act, through § 62, did not have
the purpose of broadening workmen's compensation benefits to persons who are not
employees. Instead, § 62 had the purpose of obviating the sometimes difficult and
troublesome construction of who was an employee's employer on a construction project
where there were numerous subcontractors and of eliminating the use of irresponsible
subcontractors as a device for avoiding workmen's compensation. The court further
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Generally, a subcontractor is not immune to a negligence action
brought by an employee of another subcontractor on the same job.
The usual view is that only the employee's workmen's compensation
insurer can be considered his "employer" under the terms of the act.5
A minority of jurisdictions consider subcontractors in this situation
to be statutory employers because of express statutory provision6 or
because of judicial construction of standard compensation statutes. 7
In Maryland, the courts have not clearly established the status of
subcontractors in relation to employees of other subcontractors on the
same job.' When this issue does arise, the Maryland courts will prob-
ably follow Crown Cork and Seal Co. v. HutterY decided in the
Superior Court of Baltimore City. The question presented in that case
stated that in order to "assure the workman his contemplated compensation, the
statute has imposed, under a certain state of circumstances, a liability on the prin-
cipal contractor, although he might not have been held at common law the employer
of the injured workman." 154 Md. at 162, 140 A. at 53 (emphasis added).
Stated in another way, the principal contractor is liable for workmen's com-
pensation to employees of his subcontractors even where no master-servant relationship
exists between them merely to guarantee that such employees are covered. A subcon-
tractor or any other party does not have this anomalous statutory liability and must
have a master-servant relationship with the injured employee in order to invoke the
Act and escape third-party tort liability. Because of this construction of the Act in
Hubert, it does not appear that the Maryland courts agree that the principal contractor
becomes the employer of employees of a subcontractor for all purposes as the Carter
court did. See Palumbo v. Nello L. Teer Co., 240 F. Supp. 226 (D. Md. 1965).
In Peters v. Radcliff Ready Mix Concrete, Inc., 412 S.W.2d 854 (Ky. 1967),
the Kentucky Supreme Court held, under a statute similar to Maryland's, that a
subcontractor was liable in a negligence action as a third party to the employee of
another contractor on the same job, on the ground that the subcontractor was not
the workmen's compensation insurer of the employee and therefore was not his
"employer." The court said: "We think the meaning of 'employer' cannot be extended
to people who have none of an employer's obligations (such as the principal contractor's
workmen's compensation obligation to employes [sic] of a subcontractor) .. " Id. at
856. In Dillman v. John Diebold & Sons Stone Co., 241 Ky. 631, 44 S.W.2d 581(1931), the court held that a subcontractor was liable in tort to an employee of the
principal contractor on the ground that the employee had no right of workmen's
compensation against the subcontractor: "[WIe cannot construe the statute as taking
away their right to sue and putting nothing in its place." 44 S.W.2d at 583. This
result seems consistent with the Maryland prerequisite of a master-servant relationship.
5. See, e.g., Davison v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 169 Kan. 256, 218 P.2d 219(1950) ; Portman v. Hanman Bldg. Corp., 131 Misc. 168, 226 N.Y.S. 395 (Sup. Ct.1928); 2 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 72.32 (1961).
6. Minnesota, Oregon, and Virginia follow policies similar to Florida on the
basis of specific statutory wording. See 2 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
§§ 72.32-34 (1961).
7. Like Florida, Massachusetts construes a typical workmen's compensation
statute to include subcontractors and prime contractors in the same employment family.
This is called the "umbrella" theory. An excellent discussion of the evolution of
the Massachusetts view is contained in 2 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
§ 72.35 (1961).
8. Clough & Malloy, Inc. v. Shilling, 149 Md. 189, 131 A. 343 (1925), is the only
Maryland Court of Appeals case involving a suit against a subcontractor as a third
party. It is of doubtful authority, however, because the issue of whether the negligent
subcontractor could be considered an "employer" of the injured employee of another
subcontractor on the same job under the Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act
was not raised. The court merely assumed that the negligent subcontractor was a
third-party amenable to suit. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, applying Maryland law in Hardesty v. Alliance Plumbing & Heating
Co., 316 F.2d 361 (D.C. Cir. 1963), concluded that Clough stood for a rejection of
the so-called "umbrella theory," as propounded in the Carter case. See note 7 supra.
9. Reported in 110 The Daily Record (Baltimore), March 13, 1943, at 5, cols.
1-2, cited in Thomas v. Hycon, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 151 (D.D.C. 1965).
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was whether a fellow servant was a third party amenable to suit in tort
by an injured co-employee under the workmen's compensation statute.
The defendant contended that as a fellow servant he bore a close enough
relation to the employer to share his immunity from suit in tort under
the statute. The relevant provision of the Maryland Code' ° provides
for a suit in tort against "some person other than the employer." In
considering this section the court stated:
The "other person" referred to need not be an outsider, a stranger
having no connection with the work. He may be a principal con-
tractor, a subcontractor on the same job or the owner of the enter-
prise or the borrower of a servant for temporary service.
The court held that the fellow employee was liable and that the test
for immunity under the statute was "not whether he falls strictly within
the definition of 'employer,' but whether in obedience to the law, he
has paid or provided for compensation to the injured person."
Similar reasoning has been employed in the few cases which have
considered the tort liability of members of a joint venture to injured
employees. In Hamman v. United States," the plaintiffs sought
damages in tort for the death on the job of their decedents who were
workmen employed by Yellowtail Constructors, which was composed
of the defendants. The defendants claimed immunity from civil liability
under the terms of the Montana Workmen's Compensation Act 2 as
joint venturers. Plaintiffs contended that under Montana law a mem-
ber of a joint venture is not an "employer" to an employee of the joint
venture and is therefore not immune from third-party tort actions.
The district court held that a member of a joint venture is an "em-
ployer" within the meaning of the Montana Workmen's Compensation
Act and that the injured employee may not avail himself of any remedy
other than that provided by the Act.13 The court based its decision
on both the wording of the statute14 and its feeling that "a joint ven-
ture is not a separate legal entity, that an employee of a joint venture
is an employee of each of the joint venturers under ordinary principles
of agency, and that each joint venturer and his insurance carrier was
10. MD. COMi ANN. art. 101, § 58 (1964 repl. vol.).
11. 267 F. Supp. 420 (D. Mont. 1967).
12. 92 MONT. Rev. Cones ANN. §§ 101-1222 (1947). Section 410 defines
"employer" in part as "every person, firm, volunteer association and private corpora-
tion." In Hamman, the court held that "this language is broad enough to include
within its terms a 'voluntary association' such as a joint venture." 267 F. Supp. at 426.
13. The court also held that had there been a change from employment by one of
the defendants alone to employment by the defendants as a joint venture without the
knowledge and consent of the employee, the right of the employee to maintain a
negligence action against the joint venture would not be barred. 267 F. Supp. at 428;
accord, Richardson v. Walsh Constr. Co., 334 F.2d 334 (3d Cir. 1964); see Fisher v.
City of Seattle, 62 Wash. 2d 800, 384 P.2d 852 (1963). In Maryland, a change of
employer without the knowledge and consent of the employee would appear to give
the injured employee a right to maintain a negligence action against the second
employer in lieu of workmen's compensation. Because workmen's compensation is
contractual, there must be a contractual relation between the employee and the second
employer in order to render the latter immune from suit in tort. Thomas v. Hycon,
Inc., 244 F. Supp. 151 (D.D.C. 1965) (employee allowed to sue subsidiary of employer
as third party tort-feasor).
14. See note 13 supra.
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severally and jointly liable for an award to an injured employee of
the joint venture."'"
Members of a joint venture are generally considered "employers"
under workmen's compensation acts and are thus immune from negli-
gence actions brought by employees of the joint venture on the ground
that a joint venture is not a distinct entity apart from its members.
Therefore, an employee of a joint venture is deemed an employee of
each of its individual members via ordinary principles of agency. 6
There are no Maryland cases dealing with the joint venture issue
presented in Hamman.17  Because joint ventures and partnerships in
Maryland are regarded by the courts as being indistinguishable for
most purposes, s8 any case in Maryland analogous to Hamman will
probably be decided on partnership principles. Maryland has adopted
the Uniform Partnership Act which makes individual partners jointly
and severally liable in tort and jointly liable in contract.'9 Since work-
men's compensation insurance coverage is contractual in nature, an
15. 267 F. Supp. at 425. Plaintiffs contended that under the Uniform Partnership
Act, 63 MONT. Rzv. ConEs ANN. § 207 (1947), partners are liable jointly and severally
in tort but are only jointly liable for contract debts and obligations of the partnership.
Since workmen's compensation is contracted, plaintiffs argued that "there can be no
several immunity because there is no several liability." 267 F. Supp. at 424. The
court rejected this argument because it rejected the applicability of the entity theory
of partnership for workmen's compensation purposes.
16. Richardson v. Walsh Constr. Co., 214 F. Supp. 126 (W.D. Pa. 1963); W. B.
Johnson Grain Co. v. Self, 344 P.2d 653 (Okla. 1959). Most jurisdictions have
not yet spoken in this area, but some have dealt with an analogous problem, i.e.,
whether an employee of a partnership covered by workmen's compensation insurance
can bring an action in negligence against an individual partner for injury suffered
in the course of his employment. This problem is significant because the difference
between joint ventures and partnerships, if any, is not well defined. See Mechem,
Law of Joint Adventures, 15 MINN. L. Rzv. 644 (1931) ; Comment, Joint Venture:
Problem Child of Partnership, 38 CAL. L. Rev. 860 (1950) ; Comment, Joint Venture
or Partnership, 18 FORDHAm L. Rzv. 114 (1949).
In Maryland, the courts seem to feel that partnerships and joint ventures are
essentially the same. Atlas Realty Co. v. Galt, 153 Md. 586, 139 A. 285 (1927). In
Brenner v. Plitt, 182 Md. 348, 355, 34 A.2d 853, 857 (1943), the court stated that to
constitute a joint venture, the parties "must intend to be associated as partners, either
as general partners, or merely for the duration of the joint adventure." In Hobdey v.
Wilkinson, 201 Md. 517, 526, 94 A.2d 625, 628 (1953), the court stated that a joint
adventure "is really in law a partnership for a single transaction or for a limited
number of transactions." See Mullen, Joint Ventures, 8 MD. L. Riv. 22, 38 (1943).
Whether or not a partner is immune from a negligence action brought by an
employee if the partnership is covered by workmen's compensation insurance is usually
based on the particular theory of partnership followed in a given jurisdiction. In
states adhering to the aggregate theory of partnership, the partner is immune from
suit on the ground that employees of the partnership are employees of each of the
partners. Sonberg v. Bergene, 220 Cal. App. 2d 681, 34 Cal. Rptr. 59 (Dist. Ct. App.
1963). In states recognizing the theory that a partnership is a distinct legal entity apart
from its individual members, an injured employee may bring a tort action against a
negligent partner on the ground that the individual partner is considered a "third
person" under the workmen's compensation act, since the only "employer" is the part-
nership entity. Monson v. Arcand, 231 Minn. 336, 58 N.W.2d 753 (1953) ; Gleason v.
Sing, 210 Minn. 253, 297 N.W. 720 (1941). This is the so-called "Minnesota rule."
This type of partnership-workmen's compensation problem, like. the joint
venture-workmen's compensation problem has not been raised in most jurisdictions.
17. There are also no analogous partnership cases in Maryland. That there were
few such cases in this country is clear upon examination of the annotation in Annot.,
114 A.L.R. 724 (1922). For the Maryland law of joint ventures, see Mullen, Joint
Adventures, 8 MD. L. Rev. 22 (1943).
18. See note 17 supra.
19. MD. CODn ANN. art. 73A, §§ 13, 15 (1967 repl. vol.).
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injured employee of a partnership or joint venture may wish to argue,
as did his counterpart in Hamman, that the negligent partner or joint
venturer is liable as a third person because lack of several liability
implies lack of several immunity.2" It is hoped that the Maryland court
will reject this argument and will hold the partner or joint venturer
immune from suit because of his master-servant relationship with the
employee and because he, along with the other partners or joint ven-
turers, is the employee's workmen's compensation insurer. These are
the principles adhered to in Hamman. The Carter court seems to have
overlooked them in a maze of judicial construction.
ZONING - Validity Of A Five-Acre Minimum Lot Require-
ment Upheld In Maryland. County Comm'rs v. Miles, 246 Md. 355,
228 A.2d 450 (1967). As part of a comprehensive plan for Queen
Anne's County, the County Commissioners placed a five-acre minimum
lot requirement on 6.7 percent of the land area of the county, including
the plaintiff's 588 acre dairy farm. Fifty properties, with an average
area of 320 acres and comprising 29.80 percent of the total water
frontage of the county, were located within the area covered by the
minimum lot requirement.
Under the Maryland Code, the legislative body of a county is
given the power to zone "[f] or the purpose of promoting health, safety,
morals or the general welfare of the community . . . ."' The plaintiff
claimed that the purpose of the minimum lot requirement was to restrict
the properties so that they could only be disposed of to " 'substantial'
people, of 'more than ample' financial means, "2 and was therefore aimed
at private benefit rather than a substantial public purpose. Since such
a purpose was not one of those authorized in the enabling legislation
which delegated zoning power to the Commissioners, the plaintiff con-
tended that the ordinance was invalid and contrary to the fourteenth
amendment.3 Following a verdict for the plaintiff after trial on the
merits, the defendant appealed the trial court's action in overruling
his demurrer.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, noting that only 6.7 percent
of the land of the county was zoned with a five-acre minimum lot
requirement and that the county did not lie in the path of immediate
urban expansion, held the ordinance valid. Following the rule that
there is a strong presumption of correctness in the case of original
20. Hamman v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 420, 424 (D. Mont. 1967).
1. MD. CoD- ANN. art. 66B, § 21(a) (1967 repl. vol.).
2. County Comm'rs v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 365, 228 A.2d 450, 455 (1967).
3. The plaintiff also argued that, since other farms of comparable size and
quality as his own were not similarly zoned, the action of the commissioners was
unreasonable and discriminatory and violated the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Finding that the other farms to which the plaintiff had referred
were in the path of commercial or residential development occurring within the county
whereas the plaintiff's property was not, the court held that the classifications were
"fairly debatable" and, as such, would be permitted to stand. Id. at 379, 228 A.2d at 463.
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comprehensive zoning, the court found that the plaintiff had failed to
rebut the presumption that the ordinance was in the general welfare.
Large minimum lot requirements of up to five acres in area have
generally been upheld as a legitimate exercise of a state's police power.4
However, in Simon v. Town of Needham,5 the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts stated:
A zoning by-law cannot be adopted for the purpose of setting up
a barrier against the influx of thrifty and respectable citizens who
desire to live .there and who are able and willing to erect homes
upon lots upon which fair and reasonable restrictions have been
imposed nor for -the purpose of protecting the large estates that
are already located in the district. . . . We assume . . . that a
zoning by-law cannot be used primarily as a device to maintain
a low tax rate.8
Bilbar Construction Co. v. Board of Adjustment' contains similar
language: "[M]inimum lot areas may not be ordained so large as to
be exclusionary in effect and, thereby, serve a private rather than the
public interest."'
Exclusionary zoning may be motivated by a combination of a
desire to preserve an area for persons of a distinct way of life and a
desire to maintain low local governmental costs. The trial court opinion
in Miles seems to have emphasized the former motive in finding against
the restriction. That court deemed the purpose of the ordinance to be
"the protection of large estates of certain wealthy landowners in cer-
tain selected areas of the County 'from development by insubstantial
people' . . . ."9
It is interesting to note that the few cases which have struck
down the minimum lot requirements have usually emphasized the other
motive; that is, the desire to maintain low local governmental costs.
4. See, e.g., one acre restrictions: Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42
N.E.2d 516 (1942); Gignaux v. Village of Kings Point, 199 Misc. 485, 99 N.Y.S.2d
280 (Sup. Ct. 1950) ; Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d
851 (1958); two acres: Young v. Town Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 226,
196 A.2d 427 (1963); Levitt v. Incorporated Village of Sands Point, 6 N.Y.2d
269, 160 N.E.2d 501, 189 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1959); three acres: Flora Realty & Inv.
Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 246 S.W.2d 771 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344
U.S. 802 (1952) ; four acres: Senior v. Zoning Comm'n, 146 Conn. 531, 153 A.2d 415
(1959) ; five acres: Fischer v. Bedminster Township, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952).
But see, e.g., Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341 (1964) ;
National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); Board
of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959). See also
1 A. RATHKOPF, ZONING AND PLANNING ch. 34, § 2 nn. 12 & 13 (3d ed. 1966); 2 E.
YOKlUY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTrc § 17-11 n. 66 (3d ed. 1965).
5. 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942).
6. 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d at 519. The statement was quoted with approval in
Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390, 396 (1959). A
similar statement is found in Gignaux v. Village of Kings Point, 199 Misc. 485, 99
N.Y.S.2d 280, 284 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
7. 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851, 858 (1959).
8. Id.
9. Opinion of the Circuit Court for Queen Anne's County (June 1, 1965) con-
tained in Appellant's Record Extract at 61, County Comm'rs v. Miles, 246 Md. 355,
228 A.2d 450 (1967).
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Board of County Supervisors v. Carper ° involved a two-acre minimum
lot requirement on the western two-thirds of what was then the fastest
growing county in the United States. The Virginia appellate court
found that "[t]he practical effect of the [zoning ordinance] amend-
ment [was] to prevent people in the low income bracket from living
in the western area .... Such an intentional and exclusionary purpose
would bear no relation to the health, safety, morals, property and
general welfare."" The court noted that the trial court "was of the
opinion that the real purpose of the [zoning ordinance] amendment
was to prevent the development of the western two-thirds of the county
as a residential area and to channel the county's population into the
eastern one-third where the cost of operating government would be
more economical."'" In National Land and Investment Co. v. Kohn,'3
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, basing its decision on much the
same grounds 14 as the court in Carper, found unconstitutional a four-
acre lot requirement placed on thirty percent of a township which was
in the path of the suburban development of Philadelphia.
There is some authority for the position that large minimum lot
requirements at some point become unreasonable per se. In upholding
a one-acre lot requirement in Simon v. Town of Needham, the Massa-
chusetts court said:
We cannot quite pronounce the instant by-law invalid when applied
to the petitioner's land. . . . We make no intimation that, if the
lots were required to be larger than one acre or if circumstances
were slightly different, the same result would be reached.' 5
Quoting those "words of caution," the same court held invalid an
ordinance requiring a minimum lot of 100,000 square feet in Aronson
v. Town of Sharon3
It can be argued that to the extent that minimum lot restrictions
deny to citizens of certain income levels the opportunity to purchase
desirable property from a willing seller and in effect preserve desirable
areas for a privileged group, there is a violation of the equal protection
10. 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
11. 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d at 396. The court's decision was also based on the
finding that the ordinance lacked uniformity due to a provision in the law permitting
some landowners to record plots for one-half acre lots for a period of two years after
the passage of the ordinance.
12. 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390, 395 (1959).
13. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). See also Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Board of
Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958) (upholding a one acre requirement in
the same township).
14. "A zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of
newcomers in order to avoid future burdens, economic and otherwise, upon the adminis-
tration of public services and facilities cannot be held valid." 419 Pa. 504, 215 A2d
597, 612 (1965).
15. 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516, 520 (1942) (emphasis added). Cases cited
notes 5 & 6 supra and accompanying text.
16. 346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341 (1964). One acre equals 43,560 square feet.
On the other hand, the argument that a five acre minimum lot requirement is unreason-
able per se has been rejected. See Fischer v. Bedminster Township, 11 N.J. 194, 93
A.2d 378 (1952).
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clause of the Constitution.' 7 However, the appellate courts, consistent
with the Carper and Kohn cases, have not adopted this rationale as a
basis for decision'" but instead have focused on the narrower question
of whether the restrictions are sufficiently related to legitimate zoning
purposes as to not constitute an abuse of the power delegated to the
respective zoning boards.
In cases involving large minimum lot restrictions, there is a close
interrelationship between the legitimate and illegitimate factors which
a zoning board may consider in determining the propriety of the restric-
tion.' 9 In many cases, including Miles, a court may well suspect that
the overriding purpose of the lot restriction is to benefit a privileged
group, even though legitimate purposes are urged as the ostensible
reason for the restriction. However, the difficulty in discerning which
factors are operating renders most zoning board decisions "fairly de-
batable," and, in view of the normally narrow scope of judicial review
17. Stephenson, The Future of Rural Residence Zoning, in ZONING FOR MINIuMM
LaT ARA 84 (2d ed. J. Stephenson 1961). Stephenson claims the language of Professor
Charles M. Haar implies such an argument:
Aside from race and national origin exclusions which still persist, segregation
is being increasingly accomplished in terms of levels of prices and rentals, of home
ownership versus renting, even of age and of veteran status. Exclusionary planning
devices which are designed to accomplish such segregation should not be saved by
dint of "liberal" cosmetics or "progressive" polish.
Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARV. L. Rgv.
1051, 1063 (1953). It is not clear that such a reading of the statement is proper. See
Noland & Horack, How Small a House? - Zoning for Minimum Space Require-
ments, 67 HARv. L. Rzv. 967, 976 (1954).
18. The Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue. In Flora Realty & Inv.
Co. v. City of Ladue, 344 U.S. 802 (1952), dismissing appeal from 362 Mo. 1025,
246 S.W.2d 771 (1952), the court dismissed an appeal in a three-acre minimum lot
requirement case for lack of a substantial federal question. Perhaps advocates of large
lots can take some comfort from the venerable case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 364 (1926). There the Court recognized the validity of ordi-
nances creating residential districts from which business and trade "of every sort,
including ... apartment houses" were excluded. Id. at 390. Apartment houses were
included partly because their presence retarded the development of detached houses
and was parasitic in its manner of taking advantage of the open spaces in detached
residence districts, but partly also because of the consideration of light, air, safety,
and congestion.
Most cases involving the constitutionality of zoning ordinances have focused on
the rights of property owners, not those of prospective purchasers or residents. In
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), the Court declared an ordinance
invalid as to the plaintiff's property because the land was "of comparatively little value
for the limited uses permitted by the ordinance." Id. at 187.
In Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), the use of a zoning ordinance to
achieve racial segregation was found unconstitutional.
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 27 (1954), upholding the taking of plaintiff's
land under the power of eminent domain as part of the redevelopment of southwest
Washington, D.C., is cited in minimum lot requirement cases as setting out a broad
definition of the scope of police power.
19. Preservation of property values is, to some extent, a function of the preven-
tion of the intrusion of smaller lots in an area zoned for larger tracts. This is, of
course, economic segregation. But preservation of property value is apparently recog-
nized as a legitimate end. See, e.g., Flora Realty & Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo.
1025, 246 S.W.2d 771, 776 (1952). Maintaining the natural beauty of an area is a
function of excluding smaller lots which break up the countryside; but excluding
smaller lots is a form of economic segregation. Aesthetic considerations have been
recognized as legitimate ends for zoning. See, e.g., Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Board of
Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851, 856-57 (1958).
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of administrative determinations, 20 the courts are unwilling to invalidate
zoning ordinances merely because they have an exclusionary effect.
Most cases involving the reasonableness of an "exclusion" have
related to restrictions affecting property within a single zoning juris-
diction. However, it has been recognized by the New Jersey Supreme
Court that the problem is not limited by jurisdictional boundaries:
What may be the most appropriate use of any particular
property depends not only on all the conditions, physical, economic
and social prevailing within the municipality and its needs, present
and reasonably prospective, but also on the nature of the entire
region in which the municipality is located and the use to which
the land in that region has been or may be put most advan-
tageously. The effective development of a region should not
and cannot depend upon the adventitious location of municipal
boundaries .... 21
Thus, a problem arises when "the community," in its proper planning
sense, encompasses an entire metropolitan region which in itself con-
tains several independent zoning authorities. Failure by one of these
authorities to consider the needs of the region as a whole constitutes
misuse of the zoning power as a use for "private purposes," even
though the "private purposes" are those of the entire zoning jurisdic-
tion.2 If a jurisdiction adopts a large minimum acreage requirement
inconsistent with the needs of the region as a whole, the restriction
may be found to be impermissibly exclusionary.23 If a jurisdiction
adopts a minimum acreage requirement which, though exclusionary in
nature, fits into the development of the metropolitan region of which
20. [T]he scope of judicial review is substantially the same in all jurisdictions.
The questions for the court in such proceedings have been variously stated as
whether the board's determination was "contrary to law," "illegal," "unlawful,"
"an abuse of power," "an abuse of discretion," "arbitrary," or "capricious."
Despite the different phrases used to determine the basic question involved,
an examination of the cases discloses that, to a great degree, they are synonymously
used.... [W] hen the conclusion arrived at by the board on [substantial] evidence
is "fairly debatable," the court will not substitute its judgment on facts for that
of the board.
The burden of proof rests upon the petitioner attacking the determination of
the administrative body to overcome the presumption of validity and to show
affirmatively that the board abused its discretion or that there was not substantial
evidence to support its determination.
2 A. RATHKOP', ZONING AND PLANNING ch. 65, §§ 1, 6 (3d ed. 1966) (footnotes
omitted).
21. Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d
347, 349-50 (1949). The statement is frequently quoted as a statement of the doctrine
of "regionalism."
22. Stephenson, The Future of Rural Residence Zoning, in ZONING I'OR MINIMUM
LoT AREA 84 (2d ed. J. Stephenson 1961).
An implication of the argument is that "purpose to exclude" may be irrelevant
with respect to the reasonableness of zoning by a local jurisdiction situated within a
larger metropolitan area. But see cases cited notes 5 & 6 supra and accompanying text.
23. See National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965) ;
Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959). See
notes 10-14 supra and accompanying text.
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it is a part, the restriction may be found to be reasonable despite its
exclusionary aspects.24
A limiting principle is recognized in Arverne Bay Construction
Co. v. Thatcher.26 If the landowner can show that the development
which was anticipated at the time a tract was originally restricted has
not in fact occurred, the restriction may be found unreasonable as
constituting an impermissible hardship on the landowner.2" Thus, if
property were zoned for lots so large that demand for the property was
insufficient to permit development within a reasonable time, the restric-
tion could be removed.
24. See Flora Realty & Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 246 S.W.2d 771,
775 (1952), in which the respondents presented evidence tending to show "that the
city of Ladue was located . . . directly in the path of better residence development
[outward from St. Louis]."
25. 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938).
26. Id. The case did not involve a minimum lot restriction. It involved the desig-
nation of the plaintiff's land for residential use when, in fact, the land could not
profitably be put to any such use within a reasonable time. The designation had been
made ten years prior to the action.
Language to that effect in a minimum lot restriction case is found in Fischer
v. Bedminster Township, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378, 384 (1952). Cf. Nectow v. City of
Cambridge 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
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